recently published by General David Petraeus and a Fort Leavenworth team.
Ricks highlights how Odierno adopted this new COIN approach in the employment of the five surged combat brigades. Instead of putting all the additional forces into central Baghdad to "secure the people," Odierno deployed them into the fractious "Baghdad belts." During the surge, American troops would not only live among the Iraqi people in "joint security stations" and combat outposts but also target the insurgent lines of operations running from Syria and Iran into central Baghdad.
Overall, this appears to be a balanced narrative of a war not yet finished. In the last section Ricks considers the lasting effects of the "surge" strategy pursued in [2006] [2007] [2008] Press, 2007. 391pp. $17.96 Paradoxically, this is one of the most innovative yet least original books written in the past decade on the theory and practice of international relations. Daniel Deudney synthesizes a broad understanding of the history of Western political theory with an equally broad study of contemporary world politics to recover what he calls "republican security theory." He sees this theory as having developed from the Greek polis through the Italian Renaissance to the Enlightenment (in the thought of Montesquieu especially), to the American founding to the present, and as having important implications for nuclear proliferation and disarmament in the "global village" of our time. Deudney demonstrates conclusively that the leading schools of international relations today-realism and liberal internationalism-are both intellectual "fragments" of this older tradition, with the fragmentation often obstructing practical efforts to reconcile security from external threats to the liberty of public citizens and private individuals.
Such a reconciliation is the raison d'être of republican security theory and practice, though as Deudney shows, the viability of the endeavor depends on learning much from the school of hard knocks. Twenty-five hundred years ago, the members of the Delian League sought to secure their independence from Persia by following the leadership of Athens, but in so doing they jumped from the frying pan of external anarchy into the fire of Athenian imperialism. The Roman republic, if only because its more inclusive approach to citizenship enabled it to grow stronger as it expanded, proved more successful at uniting external security with internal liberty than had Athens or the Delian League, but ultimately it got too big. Generals like Caesar, Pompey, and Augustus were able to count on the private loyalty of soldiers to help them establish What practical use might this mixed success of republican security theory be today? Clearly, it lies at the origins of the two grandest experiments in international cooperation of the twentieth century--the League of Nations and the United Nations. Rather than view the less-than-complete success, and sometimes patent failure, of either as proof that republican security theory has reached a point of diminishing returns, Deudney concludes with an analysis of how early experiments in nuclear arms control might suggest ways to apply republican security theory to avoid the danger of nuclear violence while preserving individual freedom. In this respect, Deudney appears to have more in common with contemporary liberal internationalists than with today's realists, but he has no patience with charges that his project is utopian. It has worked in the past, and it continues to work in the American union. With enough intelligence and determination, he argues, it might be the only practicable solution to the global problems of this century, which no single state can address on its own. In making this claim, Deudney has gone, like the starship Enterprise (which served a federation of republics!) where few today have gone before, to help found a new discipline, one that might be called "world political theory." At a time when U.S. maritime strategy has become ever more concerned with the security of the global system, this is a book that thoughtful strategists will need to read again and again.
KARL WALLING

Naval War College
Coicaud, Jean-Marc. Beyond the National Interest. Washington D.C.: United States Institute of Peace Press, 2007. 297pp. $19.95 It should come as little surprise that Jean-Marc Coicaud, a noted French scholar with extensive experience at the United Nations, sees the need for a fundamental change in the way the international system addresses its most pressing security problems. He bemoans the fact that "narrow national interests" have made prompt, effective multilateral peacekeeping interventions on behalf of humanitarian needs very difficult. In his Beyond the National Interest he offers prescriptions to alleviate this situation.
This short book covers in some detail the history of international humanitarian interventions since the 1990s, in search of trends and lessons learned. The author conveys a sense of optimism that the end of the Cold War presented a perfect opportunity for universal human values to displace traditional values according to which sovereignty was sacrosanct and nation-states responded only to direct external threat. He optimistically proclaims that NATO was moving forward progressively in this direction.
Unfortunately, his detailed historical examples consistently belie this
